Mossfield Colliery explosion, 1940

Eleven men died in an explosion in the Cockshead seam at Mossfield Colliery, Longton, at about a quarter past one on the morning of 21 March 1940 — the same seam that had killed sixty-four in 1889. Twelve were at or near the 15's Level face; only the fireman, Arthur Seaton, survived. The chief inspector of mines traced it to firedamp built up behind the very packs that had been built to seal off a heating six days earlier.

Cause

Firedamp accumulated behind newly built stoppings and a barrier pack, and ignited by spontaneous combustion at some point that could not be reached.

Contributing factors

The sealing of the No. 3 waste and then the building of an eight-foot barrier pack across the face shut off the leakage of fresh air, letting gas collect and letting the temperature rise inside the confined area until oxidation ran away into active combustion. No air samples were taken, either in the return when the smell was first noticed or later through pipes into the packed-off goaf.

What happened

The Cockshead at Mossfield had an unenviable reputation. Sir W. N. Atkinson had described the special methods the seam required — avoiding leakage through the packs, withdrawing supports systematically, working in separate panels with one way in and one way out for the air, so a district could be isolated fast. 15's Level was a ninety-yard mechanised longwall face, the coal cut two feet six from the floor and carried out by a compressed-air shaker conveyor. At about half past six on the morning of Friday 15 March the contractor William Neil Washington reached the third waste and noticed a peculiar oily smell, stronger than the Cockshead's usual. The day fireman Marshall Carson picked it up too and reported it to the overman, John William Birks. Birks had the loose coal and hussle cleaned out, came back at half past ten, and, crawling forty-four yards to the back of the waste, knocked the dust off his trousers and saw it drift: air was coming through. The undermanager Samuel Baker ordered timbering for a stopping; the manager Josiah Foster came down at one o'clock, agreed, and ordered a second stopping nearer the face. Work on the barrier pack along the whole length of the face went on through the weekend and finished on Tuesday the 19th. The smell faded, and Seaton, coming on for the Wednesday night shift, thought the barrier pack had dealt with the trouble. It had not. At about 1.15 a.m. Seaton had come down the face for Cardox shells from the tub in the level when, as he put it, 'there was a complete blackout. I thought something had struck me and remembered nothing more until I regained my senses in hospital.' Outbye, the roadman George Boulton felt his ears go and saw a cloud of whitish dust coming towards him; at the pit bottom the overman Thomas Shenton felt the air reverse for a moment. Among the dead were Roland Porter, aged 55, and his son Richard, aged 27.

Rescue & recovery

Shenton, Boulton and the fireman Charles Clewlow went in together and were quickly joined by others; two rescue teams descended and the injured were taken to hospital. Eight bodies were out by the early hours. The whole night shift, 110 men, was withdrawn. The level was clear but smelt of burning — a smouldering bag near the haulier, another on the wheels of an overturned tub — and it was plain enough that spontaneous combustion somewhere out of reach had done it. The district was sealed off, stoppings in the intake and return complete twelve hours after the explosion.

Investigation & inquiry

F. H. Wynne, H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines, held the inquiry jointly with the inquest, by arrangement with the deputy coroner for Stoke-on-Trent, Major Gerald W. Huntbach, at Hanley town hall on 24 and 25 April 1940. The coroner's verdict was that the eleven men 'perished from injuries caused by an accidental explosion in the Cockshead seam'. Wynne's own conclusion was that a considerable volume of firedamp had been ignited, and that it had been able to collect precisely because the leakage of fresh air through No. 3 waste had been sealed and then further obstructed by the barrier pack. He observed that air samples — from the return as soon as the smell was noticed, and later through small bore pipes into the packed-off goaf — would have shown both the oxygen being consumed by incipient combustion and the oxygen being displaced by firedamp.

Legal & regulatory aftermath

No blame was found; the coroner's verdict was accidental death. The explosion was raised in the Commons on 9 April 1940.

Changes to practice & legislation

Wynne's report drew the direct comparison with 1889: 'The loss of life in the 1889 explosion was catastrophic compared to the present occurrence. There is little or no doubt that this was because that explosion was propagated by coal dust; there is also little doubt that the effects of the recent explosion would have been greatly magnified but for the fact that the roadways were copiously treated with stone dust.' His recommendation on sampling — measuring the goaf atmosphere rather than relying on whether men could still smell the heating — was the practical lesson.

Memorials & commemoration

Unknown.

Recorded claims

Individual factual claims, each attached to the source(s) that support it below. Where sources disagree, both are kept.

• Wynne concluded that a considerable volume of firedamp was ignited and that it had accumulated because the leakage of fresh air through No. 3 waste was sealed and the circulation further obstructed by the barrier pack, with the confined area heating until active combustion began. ¹
• Eleven men died and one, the fireman Arthur Seaton, survived with injuries; eight were killed outright and three of the four found alive died afterwards. ^1,2
• The inspector attributed the limited extent and violence of the 1940 explosion, against the 1889 disaster in the same seam, to the copious stone-dusting of the roadways in the intervening half-century. ^1,3

Related terminology

Mining terms this disaster is structurally linked to, with the nature of the relationship.

• Goaf (contextual relationship)
  Named 3 times in this record, first in the contributing factors: “…smell was first noticed or later through pipes into the packed-off goaf.”
• Haulier (contextual relationship)
  Named in this record’s rescue and recovery: “…level was clear but smelt of burning — a smouldering bag near the haulier, another on the wheels of an overturned tub — and it was plain…”
• Overman (contextual relationship)
  Named twice in this record, first in the narrative: “…day fireman Marshall Carson picked it up too and reported it to the overman, John William Birks. Birks had the loose coal and hussle cleaned…”
• Roadman (contextual relationship)
  Named in this record’s narrative: “…nothing more until I regained my senses in hospital.' Outbye, the roadman George Boulton felt his ears go and saw a cloud of whitish dust…”
• Spontaneous Combustion (contextual relationship)
  Named 4 times in this record, first in the summary: “…built up behind the very packs that had been built to seal off a heating six days earlier.”

Sources

1. (secondary) Mossfield Colliery Explosion – Longton – 1940 — Northern Mine Research Society
2. (secondary) Mossfield Colliery Explosion 1940 — Healey Hero / John Lumsdon
3. (secondary) Mossfield Colliery Explosion 1889, Part Two (centenary talk, Adderley Green Working Men's Club) — North Staffordshire Miners' Group / John Lumsdon

Record created: 17 September 2026 · Last researched: 20 September 2026