Mossfield Colliery explosion, 1889

An explosion at about ten to four on the morning of 16 October 1889 at Mossfield Colliery, Longton, killed sixty-four of the seventy-seven men and boys in the Cockshead and Banbury seams, along with sixteen horses. A gob fire had been smelt in the Cockshead two days before; the manager ordered a stopping built in the main airway while men were still at work below. The jury could not say how the gas was fired, but censured the manager for not having gone down the pit himself, and the coroner told him he had systematically broken the rule requiring his daily supervision.

Cause

Firedamp ignited in the Cockshead seam — the inspector could not choose between a gob fire, an open lamp, a match and a pick striking pyrites — and then carried through both seams by coal dust.

Contributing factors

Two or three inches of coal dust on the floor of the Cockshead intake and return; watering to lay it had been stopped because it heaved the floor, and repair men had been cut back to save cost. Gas standing in No. 2 drift for hours before the explosion. Airways contracted by falls left unrepaired for weeks. One fireman, Arthur Fletcher, covering both seams on the night shift. A manager and an underlooker who had not been on speaking terms for months.

What happened

Mossfield stood on the edge of Longton in the parish of Caverswall, worked by two shafts fifteen yards apart and 440 yards deep, the property of Hawsley and Bridgewood Limited, with J. G. Blackwell as managing director and James Potts as certificated manager. Three seams were worked: the Hardmine at 250 yards, the Banbury at 363 and the Cockshead at 414. The Cockshead had been troubled by gob fires for years and was, in the inspector's word, very dusty. On the afternoon of 14 October the men in one of the drifts smelt the characteristic 'gob stink'. Arthur Fletcher, the night fireman, reported it to his father William Fletcher, the underlooker, who went to the place at eight the next morning and satisfied himself the gob was heating. Potts, who a month before had been thrown from a carriage and had since been down the pit only once or twice, ordered stoppings built at the points nearest the fire — but the strata were crushing and the stoppings could not be made airtight. William Fletcher had asked more than once to be allowed to clear the standing gas from No. 2 drift and had been told not to meddle with it. He had booked men for the Sunday; they were put on other work. The explosion came at about 3.50 a.m. on the 16th. Thirteen men in the Hardmine were brought out alive. In the Banbury the blast ran right up to the face; in the Cockshead the air crossing on the horse level was destroyed and almost all the timber blown out. Sixty-four of the seventy-seven below died, and all sixteen horses. Some bodies were burnt black, though no charred dust was found on the props.

Rescue & recovery

Help came quickly from neighbouring collieries and the work went on round the clock. The Banbury was explored throughout, but only part of the Cockshead: the upper workings were the seat of the gob fire and it was judged too dangerous to admit air to them. Exploration and recovery lasted over three months. Five bodies were never brought out — Arthur Fletcher the fireman, aged 26, George Wilson, Spencer Whitehurst, Joseph Bull and William Bull — the inquiry noting only that it was 'considered imprudent to reopen that portion of the mine in which they probably lie'.

Investigation & inquiry

The inquest before A. A. Flint, coroner for the Uttoxeter division, ran seven days at Longton town hall and heard the manager and his underlooker contradict each other flatly about what had been said and when. William Bracegirdle, the hooker-on — William Fletcher's son-in-law and Arthur's brother-in-law — admitted he had willingly kept back from his first statement Arthur's remark that all Potts wanted was coal. The inspector, Mr Atkinson, listed four possible sources of ignition and would not choose between them, but was plain about the rest: Potts had made a grave error in ordering a stopping into the main airway while men worked elsewhere; supervision was defective; the airways should never have been let get into such repair. The jury found the deaths were caused by an explosion, that the evidence did not show how, that Potts was not guilty of culpable negligence in failing to withdraw the men, and that he nevertheless deserved severe censure for not inspecting the mine himself for so long.

Legal & regulatory aftermath

The coroner censured Potts on three grounds: systematic breach of Rule 21, requiring his daily personal supervision; disregard of General Rule 7, requiring him to withdraw the men in case of danger; and thinking a gob fire could be managed by deputy. Potts resigned and, by the Lumsdon account, later left the country. In the Commons on 24 February 1890 Charles Fenwick pressed the Home Secretary on whether the government would act; Henry Matthews replied that he was awaiting the report of the counsel who had attended the inquest for the Home Office.

Changes to practice & legislation

Atkinson used the disaster to argue the coal-dust case: 'However much the number of such explosions may be reduced by enforcing the use of safety lamps and restricting the use of explosives, they are likely to continue to occur so long as the mines remain in their present dusty state.' When the Cockshead exploded again in 1940 the inspector of that day wrote that the roadways had by then been copiously stone-dusted, and that this was why the second explosion stayed small.

Memorials & commemoration

Most of the dead were buried in a mass grave at Longton cemetery, where a memorial stands.

What's uncertain

Points where sources disagree or the record could not be settled; both accounts are kept. All open questions in the archive.

• The inspector, Mr Atkinson, set out four possible sources of ignition — the gob fire, an open lamp, a match, and a pick striking pyrites in the coal — and did not choose between them. (uncertain) ^1,2
• NMRS, the Lumsdon account and the Healey Hero roll all date the explosion to the early hours of 16 October 1889; the Commons question of February 1890 refers to it as having happened 'on the 17th of October last'. (disputed) ^1,4,3

Recorded claims

Individual factual claims, each attached to the source(s) that support it below. Where sources disagree, both are kept.

• The inspector, Mr Atkinson, set out four possible sources of ignition — the gob fire, an open lamp, a match, and a pick striking pyrites in the coal — and did not choose between them. (uncertain) ^1,2
• The Home Office barrister, Harold Thomas, held that the explosion was carried by dust: the Cockshead had much inflammable dust in both intake and return cruts and in the Banbury horse level, and the flame travelled by it to every place it reached. ²
• Sixty-four died. Hansard's question of 24 February 1890 gives the same figure. ^1,3
• NMRS, the Lumsdon account and the Healey Hero roll all date the explosion to the early hours of 16 October 1889; the Commons question of February 1890 refers to it as having happened 'on the 17th of October last'. (disputed) ^1,4,3
• The jury found Potts deserving of severe censure for not personally inspecting the mine for so long a time before the explosion, while clearing him of culpable negligence in not withdrawing the men on the night of the 15th. ^1,2,3

Related terminology

Mining terms this disaster is structurally linked to, with the nature of the relationship.

• Fireman (contextual relationship)
  Named 3 times in this record, first in the contributing factors: “…Airways contracted by falls left unrepaired for weeks. One fireman, Arthur Fletcher, covering both seams on the night shift. A manager…”
• Goaf (contextual relationship)
  Named twice in this record, first in the narrative: “…of 14 October the men in one of the drifts smelt the characteristic 'gob stink'. Arthur Fletcher, the night fireman, reported it to his…”
• Horse Level (contextual relationship)
  Named in this record’s narrative: “…ran right up to the face; in the Cockshead the air crossing on the horse level was destroyed and almost all the timber blown out. Sixty-four of the…”
• Onsetter (contextual relationship)
  Named in this record’s investigation: “…flatly about what had been said and when. William Bracegirdle, the hooker-on — William Fletcher's son-in-law and Arthur's brother-in-law —…”
• Spontaneous Combustion (contextual relationship)
  Named 5 times in this record, first in the summary: “…in the Cockshead and Banbury seams, along with sixteen horses. A gob fire had been smelt in the Cockshead two days before; the manager ordered…”

Sources

1. (secondary) Mossfield Colliery Explosion – Longton – 1889 — Northern Mine Research Society
2. (secondary) Mossfield Colliery Explosion 1889, Part Two (centenary talk, Adderley Green Working Men's Club) — North Staffordshire Miners' Group / John Lumsdon
3. (primary) Colliery Explosion at Longton (HC Deb 24 February 1890 vol 341 cc1014-5) — Hansard, UK Parliament
4. (secondary) Mossfield Explosion 1889, page 7 — healeyhero.co.uk

Record created: 17 September 2026 · Last researched: 20 September 2026