Wharncliffe Silkstone Colliery explosion, 1914

The ventilating fan at Wharncliffe Silkstone Colliery, near Barnsley, was stopped for about sixteen minutes on the afternoon of Saturday 30 May 1914 to be changed over from gas to steam. Gas gathered at the face in William Fisher's gate; when the fan restarted it was carried over an electric coal cutter whose switch cover was held by one bolt instead of six and was not flame-tight. Twelve men died. The jury found the whole of the management 'very negligent, but not criminally so'.

Cause

Firedamp accumulated while the ventilating fan was stopped, then carried by the restored air current over a defective electric coal cutter and ignited.

Contributing factors

The fan was stopped for about sixteen minutes for changeover from the gas engine to the reserve steam engine. Inspectors' experiments afterwards, watched by Professors O'Shea and Armstrong of Sheffield University, showed gas accumulating quickly at the face in William Fisher's gate when the fan stopped and clearing quickly when it restarted. The starting switch of the Clarke-Stevenson cutter was found in the 'on' position, its cover secured by one bolt instead of six and not flame-tight; a switch in the dummy gate was not flame-tight either.

What happened

Sinking at Wharncliffe Silkstone, five miles south of Barnsley, had begun in 1854; by 1914 the company's managing director and agent was G. Blake Walker and the certificated manager Jonathan Wroe. Five seams were connected to the shafts; only the Whinmoor, at 218 yards and about two feet six thick, was affected. The Athersley Whinmoor district was the only part being worked, longwall, with a face length of just over nine hundred yards, holing by electric coal cutters and electrically driven face conveyors. It was the Whit holidays, and the chance had been taken to move the haulage rope in the main level. Up to about one o'clock there were around a hundred and eight people in the workings; the deputy Dewis Slack finished his inspection of the No. 2 section at one, reporting a trace of gas at the top of No. 3 Top Slant but the district otherwise satisfactory. Men were leaving. When Slack came down the face the machineman's assistant Walter Bailey, nineteen, was running a rope in front of the cutter; Slack reckoned there were fifteen to twenty yards left to cut in the forty-five minutes of the shift. After he left, the cutter was started to finish the work. At about a quarter to two the deputy William Clayton, alone in the box-hole, felt a rush of wind and the air reverse in the main level, and telephoned out. At the surface the colliery engineer Frank Faure Mairet saw the automatic circuit breaker trip on a surge of current, closed it again after three minutes, read his instruments, concluded something was wrong and opened both switches with orders that they were not to be closed.

Rescue & recovery

The ventilation was easily restored with brattice sheets and the rescue presented no serious difficulty; the colliery's rescue apparatus was not needed. Pat Maycock was found slightly injured in the No. 2 level. John Thomas Fisher, forty, seriously injured, was being brought out by Harvey and Lang, who had been working in the dummy gate of No. 4 Topside Slant and escaped unhurt; he died on 10 June. The rest of the men in the No. 2 section were dead. The bodies were at the surface before the inspectors arrived: H. M. Hudspeth and Charles D. Mottram rode to the pit on motorcycles, there being no suitable train, and got there about six in the evening.

Investigation & inquiry

Indications of crusted coke dust on the roof girders, the packs and the coal at the face of the level, doors blown outbye and tubs overturned, all showed the blast had travelled outbye from the coalface. The dead men's lamps were picked up in place: all intact, in good order and locked. The inspectors found a contravention of Section 29(1) of the Coal Mines Act 1911 in the accumulation of gas, and a breach of General Rule 132 in the defective cutter. The inquest opened before P. P. Maitland, coroner for the Honour of Pontefract and the West Riding, on 1 June, sat again on the 11th after John Thomas Fisher's death, and adjourned to the 30th. The formal inquiry opened that day at the Miners' Institution, Hoyland Common, near Birdwell, conducted by Samuel Pope, barrister-at-law, and Thomas H. Mottram, one of H.M. Divisional Inspectors of Mines; their report went to the Home Secretary on 11 November 1914.

Legal & regulatory aftermath

The jury's verdict was that 'the twelve men lost their lives by an explosion of coal gas on the 30th May 1914, caused by the stoppage and restarting of the fan with a defective coal-cutting machine running at the face causing ignition, and the jury is of the opinion that the whole of the management have been very negligent, but not criminally so', with a rider trusting that the Home Office would instruct the management to be more careful in future. No witnesses were called for the Miners' Federation. Pope and Mottram closed their report by saying that they had given much thought to the question of criminal responsibility and 'found no grounds to take a different view from the Coroner and the jury'.

Changes to practice & legislation

The case joins two hazards that the 1911 Act treated separately: what happens at the face when a fan is stopped for routine engine changeover, and what a coal-cutter switch cover that is not flame-tight will do when the gas comes back over it.

Memorials & commemoration

Unknown.

Recorded claims

Individual factual claims, each attached to the source(s) that support it below. Where sources disagree, both are kept.

• The jury found that the explosion was caused by the stoppage and restarting of the fan with a defective coal-cutting machine running at the face. ¹
• The Durham Mining Museum records the cause as an explosion of firedamp, ignition caused by faulty electrical equipment on a coal cutting machine. ²
• Twelve died. The museum names all twelve, including Arthur Norman, aged 27, a conveyor belt remover whom the NMRS roll leaves out. ^1,2
• The inspectors found a contravention of Section 29(1) of the Coal Mines Act 1911 in the accumulation of gas and a breach of General Rule 132 in the defective cutter, whose switch cover was secured by one bolt instead of six and was not flame-tight. ¹

Related terminology

Mining terms this disaster is structurally linked to, with the nature of the relationship.

• Brattice (contextual relationship)
  Named in this record’s rescue and recovery: “The ventilation was easily restored with brattice sheets and the rescue presented no serious difficulty; the…”
• Coal Cutter (contextual relationship)
  Named 4 times in this record, first in the summary: “…gate; when the fan restarted it was carried over an electric coal cutter whose switch cover was held by one bolt instead of six and was not…”
• Coal Mines Act 1911 (contextual relationship)
  Named in this record’s investigation: “…locked. The inspectors found a contravention of Section 29(1) of the Coal Mines Act 1911 in the accumulation of gas, and a breach of General Rule 132 in the…”
• Holing (contextual relationship)
  Named in this record’s narrative: “…longwall, with a face length of just over nine hundred yards, holing by electric coal cutters and electrically driven face conveyors. It…”
• Slant (contextual relationship)
  Named twice in this record, first in the narrative: “…2 section at one, reporting a trace of gas at the top of No. 3 Top Slant but the district otherwise satisfactory. Men were leaving. When…”

Sources

1. (secondary) Wharncliffe Silkstone Colliery Explosion – Barnsley – 1914 — Northern Mine Research Society
2. (secondary) Wharncliffe Silkstone Colliery (UK): disasters and the names of those killed — Durham Mining Museum

Record created: 17 September 2026 · Last researched: 20 September 2026