Hill of Beath Colliery fire, 1901

An underground fire in the east section of the Lochgelly Splint and Parrot seam at Hill of Beath Colliery, Fife, killed seven men on 15 February 1901. The oversman and the fireman went to examine the stoppings that shut the fire off and did not return; a search party led by the manager walked into carbon monoxide in the return airway and most of it was lost.

Cause

Carbon monoxide from a fire that started by spontaneous combustion in the east section, a district cut off from the rest of the colliery by a fault. The stoppings built to isolate it were not tight enough, or air was reaching the fire through cracks in the strata, so the products of combustion entered the return airway.

Contributing factors

The Lochgelly Splint and Parrot seam in Fife was subject to spontaneous combustion, and fires had broken out in the section in July and December 1900. The oversman and the fireman were not told to examine the return airway and may have used it as the shortest way to the shaft; the few minutes' wait the search party made in the air current showed no sign of danger.

What happened

Hill of Beath Colliery belonged to the Fife Coal Company, Limited. The seam, the Lochgelly Splint with the Lochgelly Parrot below it, was worked longwall in two carries, the bottom coal first and the top coal afterwards from the same roads, at an inclination of about 1 in 7. The east section was separated from the rest of the colliery by a fault with only two roads across it, the intake and haulage road and the return airway. The seam was free of firedamp and coal dust and naked lights were used.

In July 1900 a fire broke out in the section and the miners were moved nearer the shaft; in September stoppings of two rough stone walls two feet thick and two feet apart, packed with redd and clayed on the outside, were built across both airways and seemed to damp the fire. A second fire, or an extension of the first, broke out in December and the workings were moved nearer the shaft again; this time the Scottish Mining Website's transcription of the report describes a line of five stoppings, nine feet of stone and redd, a foot of clay and nine inches of brickwork next the fire. A smell of fire was noticed in the section on 14 February.

On 15 February the oversman, Robert Birrell, reported the smell to the manager, Mr Richardson, who told Birrell and the section's fireman, Alexander Nasmyth, to examine the stoppings. After work stopped at about 2 p.m. they made the examination and seem to have set off for the shaft by the return airway. When they did not come up the alarm was raised, and at about 4 p.m. a search party of the manager, four miners and a rope splicer went in by the intake airway, passed the stoppings and waited a few minutes in the air current. Feeling no difficulty breathing, they started out by the return airway. The manager, leading, was affected after about 135 yards, told the others to turn back, struggled into fresh air and lost consciousness; one miner, James Grandison, retraced his steps and reached safety, and the rest did not get clear. A miner in a later party, Martin Rennie, went too far and was overcome.

Rescue & recovery

Mr Rowan, general manager of the Fife Coal Company's West section, went down with two canaries in cages and, after consulting Mr Riddell, manager of the company's Cowdenbeath Colliery, decided to run no more risk and reverse the air current. The bodies of Birrell and Nasmyth were recovered first, about 20 yards apart and some two-thirds of the way to the shaft by the return airway; the bodies of the search party were found near the face, the last being recovered on 16 February. The district was then sealed with stoppings built in the intake and return airways near the drawing shaft. The Inspector, arriving next day, could not enter the section, which was still isolated. Rowan found the canaries affected while he himself felt no ill effect.

Investigation & inquiry

J. B. Atkinson, H.M. Inspector of Mines for the East of Scotland, reported on the fire. Dr Nasmyth, who examined the bodies and saw the affected survivors, held carbon monoxide responsible. Atkinson concluded that the stoppings were not tight enough to isolate the fire, or that air was passing to it through cracks in the strata, and that the manager, who led the party and ran the same risk as the others during rescue work, was not to be blamed.

Changes to practice & legislation

Atkinson wrote that the only reliable precaution then known was to use mice or birds as indicators of the purity of the air, since a small animal's blood is saturated by carbon monoxide and it collapses before a man is affected. Mice were used regularly afterwards in the other sections of the company's collieries troubled by fire. Rowan, who had used palladium chloride paper as a test before the accident, told the Inspector that all the fires in the seam occurred while the upper part was being worked and he supposed them due to the heating of the overlying coal and blaes after it had fallen, and he was adopting barriers of solid coal between sections so that stoppings could be built with solid coal on each side.

Recorded claims

Individual factual claims, each attached to the source(s) that support it below. Where sources disagree, both are kept.

• An underground fire at Hill of Beath Colliery on 15 February 1901 caused the deaths of seven men, who were overcome by carbon monoxide. ^1,2
• The fire started by spontaneous combustion in the east section of the Lochgelly Splint and Parrot seam, and stoppings built after outbreaks in July and December 1900 did not keep air from reaching it. ^1,2
• After the oversman and the fireman failed to return from examining the stoppings, a party of six led by the manager went in at about 4 p.m.; the manager and one miner survived and the rest were lost. ^1,2
• The air current was reversed to reach the bodies after the general manager had tested the air with canaries, and the section was then sealed with stoppings near the drawing shaft. ^1,2
• The Inspector attached no blame to the manager and recommended mice or birds as indicators of carbon monoxide; mice were in regular use afterwards in the company's fiery sections. ²

Related terminology

Mining terms this disaster is structurally linked to, with the nature of the relationship.

• Blaes (contextual relationship)
  Named in this record’s changes to practice: “…and he supposed them due to the heating of the overlying coal and blaes after it had fallen, and he was adopting barriers of solid coal…”
• Canary (contextual relationship)
  Named twice in this record, first in the rescue and recovery: “…manager of the Fife Coal Company's West section, went down with two canaries in cages and, after consulting Mr Riddell, manager of the company's…”
• Overman (contextual relationship)
  Named 3 times in this record, first in the summary: “…of Beath Colliery, Fife, killed seven men on 15 February 1901. The oversman and the fireman went to examine the stoppings that shut the fire off…”
• Return Airway (contextual relationship)
  Named 10 times in this record, first in the summary: “…a search party led by the manager walked into carbon monoxide in the return airway and most of it was lost.”
• Spontaneous Combustion (contextual relationship)
  Named 3 times in this record, first in the cause: “Carbon monoxide from a fire that started by spontaneous combustion in the east section, a district cut off from the rest of the…”

Photographs & further reading

This page doesn't try to reproduce everything — these are the best original sources found for this disaster.

Sources

1. (secondary) Hill of Beath Colliery Fire - Fife - 1901 (NMRS) — Northern Mine Research Society
2. (primary) Hill of Beath 15th February 1901 (Scottish Mining Website) — Scottish Mining Website

Record created: 30 September 2026 · Last researched: 30 September 2026