Oakley Colliery shaft fire, 1895

On 31 May 1895 the wooden lining of No. 3 Pit, the upcast shaft of Kinneddar (Oakley) Colliery near Dunfermline, caught fire from a ventilating fire lit at its foot that morning. When the lining burned out, flame and hot air were driven over men building stoppings in the Jersey seam; seven were burned and died within a day, and two more fell down No. 2 Pit in the confusion.

Cause

A new open fire, about 3 cwt of coal on iron rails laid on bricks, was lit at the bottom of No. 3 Pit to clear blackdamp from the Jersey seam, with no precaution against it igniting the 3-inch wooden lining of the shaft. The lining took fire, and as it and the clay and debris behind it fell the air was reversed twice, forcing flame, hot air and smoke over the men.

Contributing factors

Ventilation came from furnaces in the upcast. The exposed timber had been watered by pail because it was known it could ignite, but the new fire was erected on the undermanager's own initiative with no precaution against the woodwork; the bottomer who usually tended the fires was absent that day. A guard on the east side of No. 2 shaft at the Jersey mid-working was not connected to its indicator in the engine house, which a special rule required.

What happened

Kinneddar Colliery, known also as the Oakley colliery, lay between four and five miles west of Dunfermline and was owned by Fifeshire Main Collieries, Limited. It had three shafts. No. 1 was used as a downcast for the Jersey workings. No. 2 was the main shaft, 21 feet by 7, which drew coal from both the Jersey and the Splint seams, carried the men and was the main downcast; the Splint lay at 65 fathoms and the Jersey 11 fathoms above it. No. 3, 12 feet by 6 and lined with 3-inch wood from the surface to the Splint seam, was the upcast and the second outlet; its sinking was finished at the end of 1893. Until November 1894 the ventilation was produced by a fire lamp and open fire, and then by a furnace known in Scotland as a cube.

Blackdamp in the west level of the Jersey seam and warmer weather called for more air. On 31 May 1895 the undermanager, John Cooper, with the fireman, Alexander Thompson, erected an open fireplace at the bottom of No. 3 Pit and lit it at about 7.30 a.m.; no precautions were taken against the woodwork, and the manager, Robert Calderwood, told of it at breakfast time, gave orders to have it watched. 118 men went down at 7 a.m. At about 2.30 p.m., with the shift nearly over, three small flames were seen in the packing above the bars. Pails of water failed to put them out and an attempt to take down the timber failed; flame ran up the shaft, reached the surface and set alight the framework, pulleys and the wooden building of the winding engine.

Work underground turned to building stoppings to cut off the air to the burning shaft. Men were at work on one in the cross-cut mine in the Jersey seam, 36 feet from the shaft, and on another in a smaller road. A first reversal of the air, probably when the cage, freed as its plank burned away, fell, blew smoke past the partly built stoppings but cleared. A second, more serious one, probably caused by the fall of clay and loose material held by the burned-out barring, forced hot air, flame and smoke over the men in the cross-cut mine. Seven of them were burned and were brought up the shaft in great pain; they all died within a day. Frank Sharp, 52, and his son Thomas, 23, had been building the other stopping; they crawled out under smoke behind a survivor, and were afterwards found at the Splint coal, having fallen down No. 2 Pit, 11 fathoms from the Jersey seam; how they came to fall was not shown in evidence. The disaster left eight widows and forty children fatherless.

Rescue & recovery

The manager sent men down to the foot of the shaft to cut off the air, went down himself, and on hearing cries from the Jersey seam had the cage lowered to it: it came up with four men terribly burned, and a second descent brought up three more. Two missing men were searched for in vain on two descents by the manager, the under-manager and a night foreman, and a third found the bodies of the two Sharps at the Splint seam. Doctors treated the injured at the pithead before they were taken to Dunfermline Cottage Hospital. Afterwards the tops of the three shafts were closed.

Investigation & inquiry

A public inquiry before John Comrie Thomson and J. B. Atkinson sat at the Court House in Dunfermline on 15 July. It found that lighting the new furnace without precautions against the adjacent timber was an error of judgment by the undermanager, John Cooper, and that the manager, who should himself have inspected the furnace before allowing it to be lit or as soon as he knew of it, was not free from responsibility, but that neither had foreseen such a catastrophe. No one was blamed for the direct cause of the seven burnings. For the two who fell it found the guard at the east side of No. 2 shaft not connected to its indicator as the special rules required, which may have contributed to their deaths. It saw nothing in the Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1887 forbidding furnace ventilation, though a furnace should be so placed that nothing adjacent could be set on fire by it; the manager admitted that furnaces were a temporary expedient and that a fan was contemplated.

Recorded claims

Individual factual claims, each attached to the source(s) that support it below. Where sources disagree, both are kept.

• A fire in the upcast shaft of Kinneddar Colliery on 31 May 1895 led to nine deaths: seven men burned in the Jersey seam and two who fell down No. 2 Pit. ^1,2,3
• A new ventilating fire lit at the bottom of the upcast, No. 3 Pit, ignited the shaft's wooden lining, and flame ran up the shaft to the surface. ^1,2,3
• As the burning lining and debris fell, the air current reversed and drove flame and hot air over men building stoppings in the Jersey seam; all seven burned died within a day. ^1,2
• Frank Sharp, 52, and his son Thomas, 23, fell down No. 2 Pit from the Jersey seam to the Splint seam, 11 fathoms, in the confusion after the air reversed. ^1,2,3
• The public inquiry held that lighting the new furnace without precautions against the timber was an error of judgment by the undermanager and that the manager was not free from responsibility, but blamed no one for the seven burnings. ^1,2

Related terminology

Mining terms this disaster is structurally linked to, with the nature of the relationship.

• Cage (contextual relationship)
  Named twice in this record, first in the narrative: “…in a smaller road. A first reversal of the air, probably when the cage, freed as its plank burned away, fell, blew smoke past the partly…”
• Chokedamp (contextual relationship)
  Named twice in this record, first in the cause: “…rails laid on bricks, was lit at the bottom of No. 3 Pit to clear blackdamp from the Jersey seam, with no precaution against it igniting the…”
• Fathom (contextual relationship)
  Named 3 times in this record, first in the narrative: “…carried the men and was the main downcast; the Splint lay at 65 fathoms and the Jersey 11 fathoms above it. No. 3, 12 feet by 6 and lined…”
• Furnace Ventilation (contextual relationship)
  Named in this record’s investigation: “…It saw nothing in the Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1887 forbidding furnace ventilation, though a furnace should be so placed that nothing adjacent could be…”
• Onsetter (contextual relationship)
  Named in this record’s contributing factors: “…own initiative with no precaution against the woodwork; the bottomer who usually tended the fires was absent that day. A guard on the…”

Photographs & further reading

This page doesn't try to reproduce everything — these are the best original sources found for this disaster.

Sources

1. (secondary) Kinneddar Colliery Fire - Dunermline - 1895 (NMRS) — Northern Mine Research Society
2. (primary) Kinneddar 1895 (Scottish Mining Website) — Scottish Mining Website
3. (secondary) Fife Pits: Oakley/Kinneddar Colliery — Fife Pits

Record created: 30 September 2026 · Last researched: 30 September 2026